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Dr Otto John was a controversial choice as head of the Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution, West Germany’s domestic counter-espionage agency. After attending a 
commemoration of the victims of the resistance plot against Hitler, on 20 July 1954, John 
disappeared from West Berlin in the company of his friend Dr Wolfgang Wohlgemuth. This 
article explores available evidence from CIA and Stasi files to assess whether John was 
abducted or went freely as a would-be defector. An examination of his mental state is crucial 
in determining this. Arguably, this event could have constituted a pivotal event in the cold 
war, yet the details have hitherto remained cloaked in confusion and mystery.  
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Late at night in July 1954, in what might have become a pivotal event in the cold war, a 
customs guard waved through a car at a border crossing with East Berlin. Unbeknownst to 
him, it contained the head of West German counter-intelligence.1  This was at the height of 
the Stasi’s kidnapping campaign.2 Using new and existing evidence, this article tests out the 
thesis put forward by Bernd Stöver that Otto John crossed the border voluntarily rather than 
being abducted.3 Although highly opaque, the Stasi files do suggest important information 
about John’s mood, psyche and motivations. The article will explore John’s biography, his 
appointment as counter-intelligence chief and his disappearance from West Berlin. It will 
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then examine his stay in East Germany and the Soviet Union before his abrupt return to the 
West. 
 
Unlike many of his countrymen, Otto John had an unblemished record as an opponent of 
the Nazi dictatorship. From 1937, while working for Germany’s commercial airline 
(Lufthansa), he had been part of the resistance movement and had participated in preparations 
for the 20 July 1944 plot against Hitler. His work as a lawyer in Lufthansa’s Madrid office 
enabled him to make contacts with British intelligence. Thanks to his position, he became 
unofficial foreign minister for the German resistance, pursuing negotiations with the sceptical 
allies. When he realised that the plot to kill the Führer had failed, he escaped from Berlin to 
Lisbon. Despite being arrested by the Portuguese and chased by the Gestapo, John managed 
to make it to Britain. There was nothing he could do to save his brother Hans, who was 
executed by the Nazis. Engaging himself fully with the British war effort, John worked 
closely with senior intelligence operative Sefton Delmer at a special propaganda unit.  
 
At Delmer’s prompting, during the last months of the war John made propaganda 
broadcasts on British radio (Soldatensender Calais), calling on German soldiers to give up. 
While John vociferously defended the resistance as German patriots, this stance put him at 
odds with many of his fellow countrymen and the postwar German establishment. The most 
serious unproven accusation was that he treasonably revealed the location of the V-2 rocket 
testing station in Peenemünde, leading to a bombing raid by the Royal Air Force. What is true 
is that, after the war was over, John acted as a screener on behalf of British intelligence, 
deciding which high-ranking officers to release from the Prisoner of War camps. At the time, 
senior German Generals thought that he was genuine and helpful, even though he made no 
secret of his contempt for Nazism. He went on to observe the prosecutions at Nuremberg for 
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six months in 1946, gathering material for a book. In the minds of those who had supported 
and defended the Third Reich, this signalled John’s transformation from amiable persecutee 
to vengeful prosecutor. It led them to question his patriotism and loyalty. In 1949, he 
increased these suspicions by acting as a translator and legal assistant for the prosecution of 
Field Marshal Erich von Manstein in Hamburg. John’s apparent shift from a ‘father 
confessor’ welfare role to active legal pursuance went down very badly in military circles; 
they saw this as an unforgivable betrayal.4 For his part, he saw anyone who had failed to 
support the abortive 20 July plot as an unrepentant Nazi. From now on, John’s many 
domestic opponents tended to see him as effectively ‘a German in British battle dress’. 
Several close friends – even committed anti-Nazis – advised him to stop working for the 
British. They saw him as, in effect, delivering his fellow countrymen ‘to the Allied 
hangman’.5  The accusations speak both of John’s integrity and value system, but also of his 
relative isolation in nascent West Germany. 
 
An unusual choice as counter-intelligence chief 
 
After the Federal Republic of Germany was established in May 1949, British advisers put 
John forward for the job of Director of the Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution (BfV), the most important domestic intelligence agency in the new state.6 
Although the cold war was well under way, the British decision to support John’s candidature 
reflected a legacy of allied tutelage. Although they supported Konrad Adenauer’s 
government, they wanted a body to oversee it and, explicitly, to protect the fragile 
constitution. For their part, the Americans pushed to have former General Reinhard Gehlen 
appointed instead, viewing John as little more than an isolated and unpopular British spy.7 
The Western Allies considered and rejected twelve other candidates before they finally 
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settled on John. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had little say in the matter; when the BfV was 
founded in autumn 1950, he viewed it as an unnecessary appendage. The BfV would operate 
in the foreground; the real espionage would be carried out by Gehlen’s Organization, 
forerunner of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND). 
 
Not a political animal, John made no secret of his strong beliefs, particularly his disgust 
at the German establishment’s pusillanimity and failure to resist Hitler prior to 1945. 
John was one of the few Germans who did not need to be ashamed of what they had 
done in the Third Reich. Nevertheless, the purism that made him irreproachable for the 
British caused friction with the more opportunistic Gehlen. When he interviewed John 
in January 1952, the exiled writer Manfred George emphasized his rare political 
integrity: ‘I found Dr John a quiet, sober and determined man... an implacable opponent 
of Nazism – his innate sense of justice was outraged by what he saw…’8 
 
John was carefully vetted, but the CIA viewed him as a dubious and unfortunate appointment, 
and was subsequently critical of what it regarded as his inefficient management. In its view, 
he lacked even basic counter-espionage experience and had unrealistic expectations. Critics 
judged him as vain and prone to emotion. For someone with responsibility for rooting out 
enemy infiltration, he was far too incautious about the people with whom he associated 
himself. According to CIA author Trimble,  
 
How was it that Otto John, a man who already showed signs of needing watching 
himself, almost an expatriate, whom Chancellor Adenauer is said to have disliked 
from first sight, was named head of the sensitive Bundesamt für 
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Verfassungsschutz? Or, as the Germans put it in their rough peasant proverb, 
‘Who put the goat in charge of the garden?’9  
 
John had links with the Minister for All-German Affairs, Jakob Kaiser, together with 
President Theodor Heuss, but for the CIA it was, above all, British backing that got him the 
post. 
 
The heavy burdens of counter-intelligence demanded someone who could shoulder them. 
By mid-1954, four years into the job, John was seen as manifestly unstable, overloaded and 
under strain; if he ever had been, he was no longer up to the tasks of the job. Numerous 
critics suggested that John was incapable of fulfilling his functions, was mired in conflict 
with his superiors and was at considerable risk of being sacked. In the altered circumstances 
of mid-1950s Germany, his moral obstinacy made him appear aloof and untrustworthy. In the 
new situation of partially restored sovereignty, he had been upset by the pervasive venom 
directed at him and his work by regrouping networks of former Nazis. For his part, Gehlen – 
who appeared to have Adenauer’s backing as well as that of the Americans – briefed against 
John, claiming that he was a Soviet as well as a British agent.10 Although Gehlen’s 
‘intellectual Heimat’ was the Wehrmacht rather than National Socialism, he allowed Nazi 
networks to infiltrate and work for his organization.11 Adding to his difficulties, John lacked 
experience in administration and had to handle underlings appointed by others. Cases of 
apparent administrative incompetence began to stack up.  
 
Even his British backers had started to have doubts about his suitability: ‘For some little 
while we have felt that the Germans should do well to replace John. Our doubts on John’s 
suitability were based on his inefficiency and his general attitude towards his work.’12 As 
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well as rumours that he was drinking heavily, in spite of warnings he insisted on maintaining 
contacts with dubious characters. John reassured the British that he was being careful. The 
CIA also pointed to an overfondness for alcohol: ‘his favourite sport when pixelated being to 
snap the elastic of women’s brassieres.’ Nevertheless, enemies also rumoured that he was a 
double agent and/or a homosexual.13  
 
On Tuesday, 20 July 1954, John was in West Berlin for the tenth anniversary of the plot to 
overthrow Hitler that had cost his brother’s life. At the ceremony in the Dahlemer Church, he 
was visibly moved. Later, at the Bendlerstrasse, he expressed anger and annoyance at two 
people who appeared to be making fun of the ceremony. The apparent presence of former 
National Socialists at a commemoration of their victims irked him immeasurably. Trimble 
was more critical, saying that John made a loud and embarrassing exhibition of himself, 
visibly sobbing while condemning two other mourners as Gestapo agents.14 That evening, 
tired and emotional, the intelligence chief disappeared from West Berlin. He left his hotel 
without saying goodbye to his wife, with whom he was on strained terms. He appeared 
morose, agitated, guarded and uncommunicative. He was in such a funk that those closest to 
him could not get through to him: he was in an unreachable daze. John was last seen in the 
company of a ‘salon communist’ acquaintance called Dr. Wolfgang Wohlgemuth.15 
Wohlgemuth (routinely pictured holding a champagne glass) was a libertine, trumpet-
blowing, playboy gynaecologist who worked at the Charité hospital in East Berlin. A roué 
and a rake, he owned several properties in West Berlin (for use by his 20-year-old wife and 
mistresses), including a surgery off the Kurfürstendamm. The handsome and debonaire 
Wohlgemuth was well known for his unreliability, his lack of morals and his ‘erotic excesses’ 
(his third wife had started out as a teenage patient). Despite his dubious reputation as a 
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smooth-talking Communist sympathizer and pill-pusher, John trusted him because he had 
treated his brother Hans for serious injuries during the war.  
 
Wohlgemuth had belonged to the Socialist Unity Party (SED) until 1949. He claimed he 
was trusted by neither side: for the Americans, he was a Communist; for the Soviets, he was 
pro-American. He was one of those figures caught between the fronts of cold-war Berlin, but 
seemed to be profiting from his ambivalent position. When the intelligence chief disappeared, 
the press speculated whether the untrustworthy doctor had blackmailed, drugged or even 
hypnotised him. Wohlgemuth’s wife revealed that he was in the habit of tape-recording his 
patients and friends. When he subsequently arrived at the nearby Charité, Wohlgemuth is 
supposed to have said ‘I have got mixed up in something stupid. He got me into a real mess. 
And I’ve also lost my car.’16 Wohlgemuth returned briefly to West Berlin to leave a letter 
expressing concern that he might be accused of having influenced John’s decision. He 
subsequently insisted that John had gone East voluntarily, but his accounts of events were not 
always consistent. Although Wohlgemuth was clearly untrustworthy, it was not clear why he 
would give up the girls and the booze, not to mention his rewarding medical practice, to 
deliver John to the Soviets.  
 
Although kidnapping was a common feature of the ‘war of nerves’ in Berlin, John was by 
far the most important and symbolically valuable figure to disappear in the city since the 
onset of the cold war. It emerged that John had emptied his pockets before leaving the hotel. 
This suggested that he was careful not to take anything sensitive with him to Wohlgemuth’s 
practice. This led the Times to wonder if he had truly crossed the border with the intention of 
betraying his country. However, the paper also suggested that he would have been more use 
to the Soviets as a double agent.17 Only a month previously, while on a visit to the USA, John 
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had had dinner with Allen Dulles, director of the CIA. Dulles recalled the meeting as irksome 
and inconsequential. The two men had not clicked, let alone shared confidences. Beyond 
denying that he was a British agent, John had made little impression on his American 
counterpart.18  
 
Shortly before his disappearance, John had been observed to be in a highly strung and 
disheartened, dispirited state. He had been passing information about renascent German 
militarism and Nazism on to his old friend, and former boss, Sefton Delmer for articles in the 
Daily Express.19 As the press scrambled to make sense of his disappearance, intelligence 
operatives provided dirt and smears. His reputation was thoroughly dragged through the mud. 
Referring to his history of defecting and to his lack of efficacy, some operatives had 
nicknamed him boomerang. Based on a statement by his wife, shortly after his disappearance, 
The Times reported that John had been suffering from acute and hopeless despondency. The 
intelligence chief had been mentally exhausted, worn down by his work, and deeply moved 
by the tenth anniversary of the plot. The newspaper quoted John’s wife as saying that this 
despair ‘arose from private as well as professional causes.’20 
 
Broadcast from East Berlin 
 
Two days after his disappearance, official East German sources broke their silence by 
announcing that John had sought asylum in the GDR. With great fanfare, the Prime 
Minister’s press office announced that the head of the BfV had made contact with the GDR 
government with the aim of discussing the reunification of Germany. The Stasi seemed to 
have pulled off a major coup: the head of the West German counter-intelligence organization 
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was now in their hands and seemed to be supporting East German propaganda. A statement 
was issued in John’s name: 
 
To my German fellow-citizens, Germany stands in danger of being torn asunder 
for ever through the dispute between East and West. Some demonstrative action is 
required in order to call upon all Germans to work for reunification. Therefore on 
the anniversary of July 20, I have taken a decisive step and have established 
contact with the Germans in the East.21 
 
John criticized Adenauer’s remilitarization policy as particularly damaging to the prospect of 
reunification. He complained of being continually attacked and ridiculed by Nazis, who were 
emerging into important positions in West German society as well as in Adenauer’s 
administration. After he went, his opponents gleefully argued that, ‘Once a traitor, always a 
traitor’.22 Gehlen and his former comrades viewed John’s actions in making contact with the 
British during the war as inexcusable.23 John’s apparent defection removed a tiresome rival 
and painted the remaining anti-Nazi resistance figures as Soviet agents. With John gone, 
there was nothing to stop his meteoric rise; he now had Adenauer’s full confidence and the 
criticisms were discredited. 
 
In a subsequent radio broadcast, this time made by the man himself, John suggested that 
the fiercely anti-Soviet West German Chancellor was avoiding making a decisive and 
determined break with the past in the Federal Republic. It is true that Adenauer prized 
experienced civil servants for their efficiency even if they had served the National Socialist 
regime.24 He was prepared to ignore their past crimes if they helped build the new state and 
its economy. In 1949, he had appointed Hans Globke as ‘virtual head’ of his Federal 
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Chancellory. Dr Globke had co-authored one of the Nuremberg Laws, thereby playing a 
crucial role in formulating Nazi racial policy.25 Historians point to a number of prominent ex-
Nazis, as well as key former generals, who strongly influenced the fledgling FRG.26 Article 
131 of the Basic Law allowed the return of soldiers, policemen and civil servants in defiance 
of denazification.27 Personnel audits merely removed the most heinous individuals.28 
Following the broadcast, Adenauer referred to John’s Übergang – ‘going over’ – but refused 
to speculate on his motives. The West German Minister of the Interior, Gerhard Schröder, 
initially offered a reward of 500,000 DM for information on what had happened. Once John 
spoke out, he was convinced that the exiled intelligence chief would be briefly exploited for 
propaganda purposes then ultimately cast aside and liquidated.29  
 
In his radio address, on 28 July, John elaborated on the dramatic gesture he wanted to 
make in terms of the prospect of German reunification. Suggesting that ‘a resolute step’ was 
necessary, he stated that he had been deprived of an opportunity to discuss his fears of a Nazi 
and militarist resurgence in the Federal Republic. The political climate of West Germany 
made a similar statement impossible there. So instead, he had made contact with the East 
Germans. A public warning was not enough; action was necessary to change Germany’s fate. 
Historian and former intelligence operative, Hugh Trevor-Roper, stresses how the emotional 
atmosphere of the anniversary of the plot against Hitler could have heightened this sense of 
betrayal.30 In John’s mind, Adenauer’s divisive, American-backed pursuit of remilitarization 
was inextricably linked to the revival of National Socialism and the threat of a new war. The 
only way to ensure that war did not occur and that Germany could be reunited was for a 
dramatic reconciliation between East and West. In this respect, John’s views overlapped with 




The BfV chief’s apparent defection put the cat among the pigeons and had tragic 
consequences for some of his associates. Ten days after John’s disappearance, his friend 
Wolfgang Hoefer, whom he had known since school, committed suicide. This unleashed 
another wave of press reports.31 Like his friend, the BfV chief, Hoefer was depressed and fed 
up with espionage work. Bitterly disillusioned, he wanted nothing more to do with the secret-
service racket. John said that Hoefer had revealed to him that he had been tasked by the 
Americans with spying on him.  
 
Despite John’s public statements about a Nazi resurgence, the mystery surrounding his 
sudden disappearance remained. Speculation continued about whether John had been 
abducted or blackmailed into defecting. Nevertheless, when he appeared at a press conference 
on 11 August 1954, the former intelligence chief appeared happy and relaxed. Unlike 
Cardinal Mindszenty, who had appeared dazed and confused during his 1949 trial, nothing 
about John’s demeanour suggested that he was acting against his will. He basked in the 
attention of the world’s media and stayed on message, even when he was temporarily out of 
earshot of his Soviet minders. Accusing Adenauer of recycling former Nazis and militarists, 
he claimed to have taken up his office because he hoped to assist in the construction of a new 
Germany, purged of National Socialism.32 For American journalists, Dr John looked alert and 
in full control of his faculties. Showing no signs of duress or ill-treatment, he was completely 
at ease in making his condemnation of Adenauer’s policy. Whatever the circumstances of his 
arrival in the GDR, it was clear that his fears about Nazism were genuine and unfeigned. 
Those who witnessed his performance stated that he spoke with conviction and sincerity. 
After fielding questions, John came down into the audience, shaking hands with old friends 
and acquaintances. Although they dismissed his claims as the result of sinister Pavlovian 
brainwashing, CIA commentators were perturbed. The normally taciturn Dulles was shocked 
12 
 
by how closely he stuck to the Soviet propaganda line.33 Having carefully coached their 
pawn, the Soviets had scored a major victory. Adenauer called John’s apparent defection 
petrifying. Interior Minister Schröder saw it as a major setback in the cold war, causing a 
crisis of confidence in the young Bundesrepublik. 
 
After this highly public emotional highpoint, John disappeared once again. It later turned 
out that he had been whisked off to Moscow and to the Black Sea coast for three months of 
intensive questioning. It was telling that John referred to this in a letter to his wife as a 
‘cure’.34 In the West, intelligence experts feared that he was revealing the names of agents. 
Nevertheless, no agents appeared to have been lost because of information provided by 
John.35 
 
Life in the golden cage 
 
Surviving Stasi files draw a veil over how John came to be in East Berlin in the first place, 
but they do reveal certain aspects of his life as a guest of the GDR state. After his curative 
sojourn in the USSR, John was taken back to East Germany. In his discussions with the Stasi, 
John said that he wanted to take part in public life in the GDR and to use his newfound 
celebrity to try to influence the population of East and West Germany in favour of 
reunification. The British communist publishers, Lawrence & Wishart, wrote to him, inviting 
him to write a short book on the situation in Germany. They were eager to publish his views 
on the problem of German re-armament and the resurrection of Nazism. At such a fraught 
geopolitical juncture, ‘such a book’ promised to have a big impact in Britain.36 Once he was 
in East Berlin, John cooperated fully with the orchestrated GDR press campaign and spoke 
several times on East German radio. Having been responsible for combating the dictatorial 
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East German regime, in public he now expressed his wholehearted support for it. He fulfilled 
his obligations to his East German hosts with numerous press conferences in the provinces. 
He even met with the eighty-year-old writer, Thomas Mann, in Weimar.  
 
For his safety and protection, the Stasi lodged John with a family of its employees: 
mother, father, daughter, son-in-law and John all lived together in a secluded cottage in 
Schmöckwitz. The house was relatively luxurious by East German standards: it was secluded, 
down a narrow private lane, and had access to a lake (the Zeuthener See) and two gardens. In 
the summer, he was allowed to use two motorboats. To provide additional protection, they 
suggested getting a guard dog. John was provided with an office in the Committee for 
German Unity. Built-in microphones recorded everything he said whether at home, at work 
or in the car. The Stasi justified their mistrust on the grounds that they wanted to avoid people 
negatively influencing him or trying to kidnap him back to the West. They tried to limit his 
contacts to those associated with the 20 July plot and a few, handpicked, reliable GDR 
citizens. His handlers were to drive him around, but never to let him out of their sight. If John 
had publically expressed his distrust of Adenauer’s decision-making, the Stasi showed little 
faith in their convert, feelings he reciprocated. 
 
Very quickly, John fell out of the limelight and into another deep depression. Embarking 
on an alternative approach to Adenauer and to West Germany, the Soviets lost interest in 
their increasingly troublesome guest. The campaign for a neutral, united Germany seemed to 
have run its course. John wrote to his wife that he was reduced to acting as an ‘itinerant 
preacher for reunification’.37 The Stasi allowed John’s friends and family contact. Some of 
his visitors were taken in by the apparent luxury, not seeing the constraints. With little to do 
in his golden cage and surrounded by people who constantly monitored his actions, John 
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again began to drink heavily. He led his Stasi handlers on a merry dance, often starting 
drinking at lunchtime and going on wild pub crawls. The Stasi noted alcoholism as his chief 
characteristic.38 When drunk, he drew attention to himself with loud and vociferous 
arguments in public. Instead of being an asset to East German intelligence, John increasingly 
became something of an embarrassment. After one particularly intense drinking session, he 
told a Belgian companion, ‘Say hello to the old Nazis over there’. His friend replied ‘You 
mean the Nazis who are here’.39 
 
If John had genuinely defected, his attempts to shake up German politics and to put 
unification back on the agenda appeared to have failed. It was just the same-old 
denunciations and counter-fulminations. In 1954 as in 1944, his attempt to alter history had 
resulted in anti-climax and disillusionment. He gave up his attempt to write a book and now 
mostly just read newspapers in his office.40 In his letters to associates, he expressed feelings 
of isolation, seclusion and despondency. His Stasi minders linked his dejection to the 
apparent impossibility of rapidly bringing about reunification. Their suggestions for him to 
‘have patience – because the timing was not yet right – did not seem to make any impression 
on him.’41 With Khrushchev prepared to recognize West Germany, the Soviets no longer 
needed John. People in the West, whose opinion he trusted, kept asking him why he had not 
stayed in West Germany to gather support for his position. If he was so keen on democratic 
renewal, why had he not raised the matter with the Western press? As Interior Minister 
Schröder perceptively noted: ‘His whole character and sympathies were with the west and all 
his friends and relations were there.’42 His meaning-sustaining network and support base both 
lay on the other side of the border. In a letter to a fellow resister, Fritz Heine of the Social 
Democratic Party, John argued that the July plotters would have supported his gesture of 
working with the Communists in order to ensure the denazification of Germany.43 
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Nevertheless, even if he had truly believed this, he seemed less and less convinced. His 
correspondence revealed that public opinion in Western Europe had failed to swing behind 
him. Rather than functioning as a catalyst, he was dismissed as a traitor and a self-defeating 
crank. 
 
Isolated and in despair, he was lonely and he missed his wife; she did not trust the 
Communists enough to come over. While John was driving his motorboats and downing 
cocktails, she had been forced out of their official residence. When the BfV stopped paying 
John’s salary, she had no choice but to sell most of their furniture to keep the family going. 
Swedish criminologist Harry Söderman wrote to John and asked him why he had decided to 
leave ‘this poor, dear woman in such a cruel way’. John’s wife could not believe that he had 
gone over voluntarily: ‘She sticks to the theory that you were hypnotized.’44 Suggesting that 
John might have been temporarily insane, he nevertheless defended the former counter-
intelligence chief against claims that he was a drinker or a homosexual.45 
 
While his wife was forced to take cover from the press by returning to England, John grew 
increasingly dispirited and melancholic. If he had gone over voluntarily, the feeling of having 
betrayed his country for no real gain must have weighed heavily on him. The propaganda 
impact and potency had ebbed away; he was just another minor news story. Calling his prison 
a monkey’s cage, John complained of all the people listening in around him. John, the anti-
Nazi resistance fighter, who had given up everything to combat the former Nazis, got into the 
habit of punctuating his comments with Heil Hitler and raising his arm in public in a Nazi 
salute. His Stasi handlers rated him as ‘really impudent, imperious and demanding’.46 The 
childish, public singing of American hit songs underlined his helplessness and lack of fit with 
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his surroundings. Nevertheless, Ernst Wollweber’s underling, Erich Mielke, was apparently 
planning a film of John’s life, in part to keep him distracted.47 
 
Stasi chief Wollweber met with him personally to try and persuade him to sober up. He 
could not convince John that he had taken the right course of action in coming over to East 
Berlin. Nevertheless, he tried to convince the man who had once been his opposite number to 
draw a line under the past and to build himself a new life in the East.48 Even in his cups, John 
said nothing to Wollweber about having been kidnapped. Although he now deeply regretted 
his choice, everything in his 24-volume Stasi file suggests that it had been his choice to come 
over. Even at his most unguarded and candid, he continued to insist that he had come freely: 
‘Do you know why I came over to the GDR? Because I could not stand it anymore.’49 This 
suggested that unhappiness with West German conditions had led to his rash action. 
Everything points to an abrupt and injudicious rather than a carefully considered move. The 
Stasi consistently spoke of John’s defection or crossing over to the GDR rather than of a 




On 12 December 1955 his handlers drove John to a meeting at the Humboldt University on 
Unter den Linden. He left them and his briefcase in the car, saying that he would only be half 
an hour. ‘Because he frequently left us waiting… four or five hours past the time he had 
stated, it did not unduly worry us when he did not [immediately] reappear.’51 In reality, he 
went straight through the building and out to a street at the back where the journalist Hendrik 
Bonde-Henriksen was waiting for him. John ducked into the car, a green Ford with Danish 
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number plates. The Dane took him through the Brandenburg Gate disguised with glasses, a 
hat and scarf and a pipe. As they crossed the border, 
 
Otto John was deeply moved and the tears rolled down his cheeks. How 
wonderful that this nightmare is over, he said with a hoarse voice, and continued: 
‘I could not have endured it any more. If we had been caught I only had one 
chance, namely to commit suicide.’52 
 
The daring escape took only seven minutes, supposedly under the watchful eyes of carefully 
positioned Allied snipers. It had been planned and coordinated by Danish military 
intelligence, with the knowledge of the West German authorities. His dramatic and perilous 
bolt for freedom had an epic quality. A shaky John could not enjoy his freedom long before 
he was encouraged to leave for West Germany. Once there, he was taken into custody and put 
on trial.53 His strange stay in East Germany had lasted seventeen months. Adenauer is 
supposed to have burst out laughing when he heard that John had come back. The SPD 
greeted his return by saying that he was a case for the psychiatrists.54  
 
The mystery of how and why John left West Berlin in the first place remained. Journalists 
asked if he had been motivated by a rash decision (while psychologically vulnerable) or by 
his political naivety. John claimed that his friend Dr. Wohlgemuth had slipped something into 
his tea. The version he gave Western intelligence agencies was that he lost consciousness in 
Wohlgemuth’s surgery and woke up in Karlshorst. He confirmed that it was the Soviets who 
had handled his reception and then had him taken away to Moscow, for three and a half 




When they confronted each other years later in court, Wohlgemuth said, ‘However 
miserable our meeting may be to-day, I can only say that you ought not to have drunk so 
much.’55 The presence of the two men (John and Wohlgemuth) in court was dramatic and 
tense, but not particularly illuminating. The more calm Wohlgemuth was, the more angry 
John got. An unbowed and unrepentant John now maintained that throughout his stay in East 
Berlin and the Soviet Union, he had acted under duress. He had played along in order to leave 
the option of escape open. Nevertheless, the British, Americans and West Germans were 
convinced that he had gone to the eastern sector of his own volition.  
 
At his trial for treason, the case hinged on whether John had defected to the East or been 
taken there against his will.  
 
In one of his last letters John said that for a long time he had become alienated 
from his office and wanted to change his profession, but his decision to go over to 
the East came over him suddenly. After the press conference... John stated that he 
had not at first intended to remain in the East.56 
 
Unavailable at his trial, the Stasi files shed some light on the case. Some of the photographs 
showed him looking haunted and wary, with bags under his eyes, but others showed him 
smiling and laughing.57 Recalling his time in the Soviet Union, John said that the Soviets 
‘questioned me nearly to death’. He claimed not to have betrayed any secrets.58 This is not 
entirely true; although he initially refused to give names of agents, under the pressure of 
continuous, repeated questioning, John provided more and more nuggets of information. The 
unrelenting questioning wore him down. When the Stasi asked him about the Gehlen 
Organisation, for example, John gave some names of people involved and details of 
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American financing. He also named people who were suspected of being double agents for 
the Soviets.59 In his defence, John said that he had feared being injected with a truth serum. 
Already weak and vulnerable, he claimed that he had only followed the Soviet propaganda 
line to avoid being sent to the Soviet Union. There, he was so desperate that he had tried to 
make himself a noose. However, the available Stasi files – partially reconstructing Soviet 
interrogations – suggest that over time he became more loose lipped. Towards the end, he 
was revealing agents’ names, ages, place of residence, appearance and occupations. He even 
revealed which covert operatives could be tempted or blackmailed into cooperation.60  
 
Stöver suggests that John may have ceased to be aware of the seriousness of the secrets he 
was revealing. It is also unclear from the documents whether John really did express himself 
as the documents record.61 In his memoirs, John suggested that the KGB knew more about 
the BfV than he did. Those who have seen the KGB’s summary notes suggest that John 
provided the Soviets with extensive written reports. These detailed not just the structure, 
tasks and working methods but also the personnel of the BfV. This contradicts John’s claim 
that he only gave unimportant information. Nevertheless, Murphy and Kondrashev argue that 
he probably did not give the KGB any information that they did not already know.62 
 
During his trial, the extent of John’s revelations to the KGB was assumed but not 
verifiable. British officials referred to the case of Cardinal Mindszenty as evidence of the 
psychological pressures and manipulation the Soviets could bring to bear.63 John took this 
line when he returned. He said that he only went along with the Soviets and their East 
German allies because this line of no resistance was what was expected of him and his agents 
should they fall into enemy hands. He stated that full cooperation was the pre-arranged 
strategy for BfV personnel in the event of capture.64 He said that if he had refused to 
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cooperate then the Soviets would have brainwashed him and forced him to divulge state 
secrets of real importance. Fears of menticide or drug- or hypnosis-induced mind control 
were palpable during this period of the cold war.65  
 
Although there are still several known unknowns, the evidence suggests that John went 
over the border voluntarily, but was subsequently kept there against his will. This was the 
view presented by Vitali Tschernjawski, head of the KGB in Karlshorst in the 1950s, after the 
fall of Communism.66 John said that he deliberately gave the impression of cooperating with 
the eastern authorities, and their version, in order to keep open his options for taking flight. 
Nevertheless, until his death in March 1997, the ex-renegade persisted in arguing for his 
innocence. He would not have crossed the border without having been drugged. However his 
cooperation at an international press conference so soon – within a month of his arrival – 
reduced credence for the argument that he had been abducted. His willingness to say what the 
Soviets wanted suggested that he had crossed the border of his own free will. 
 
At his trial, the prosecutor, Dr Max Güde (who had been a member of the NSDAP), 
described John as a weakling rather than a criminal. Witnesses pointed to his mental 
immaturity and ‘puerility’; they viewed him as not up to the pressures of public service.67 If 
the cold warriors were supposed to form an impenetrable ideological bulwark, made up of a 
strong interlinked chain of individuals fighting against alien ideals, John had clearly failed. 
There is a similarity between the way he was presented and the smearing of modern whistle-
blowers. The court thought that, under the influence of alcohol, he might have taken a rash 
decision. The suggestion that Wohlgemuth probably took advantage of a moment of 
weakness or anger at his employers was not out of the question.68 The court found John not 
guilty of treason but convicted him of ‘treacherous falsifications’ (making claims that would 
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have been secret if true).69 Arguing that he had crossed over voluntarily, the Court believed 
that John did not originally want to stay in the East. He had misjudged the situation and had 
expected to make contacts in the East and then to be able to return.  
 
John did not accept the verdict and spent the rest of his days trying to overturn it. He 
believed that the judgement was an attempt by the former Nazi judiciary to smear and punish 
him for having been part of the resistance. Nevertheless, with insufficient new evidence, his 
many attempts to reopen the verdict failed. Although some new material emerged, John was 
essentially a victim of the cold war, distrusted and rejected by both adversaries. Neither side 
had any further interest in exploring his motivations or providing exculpatory corroboration 
for his story. When his long-dreamed-of hope of Germany being reunited was finally 
realised, an 80-year-old Otto John again tried to get his case reopened. Most of his argument 
was based on statements by a KGB defector and some other Eastern European espionage 
figures.70 However, the Soviet/Russian authorities would not allow his legal team access to 
the relevant KGB documents. Dr. Wohlgemuth was no longer alive to repeat his version of 
events. In the event, John’s conviction was upheld in December 1995. He tried to appeal the 
decision, but died in March 1997, still in many respects a discredited and ruined man. Asked 
by the court to provide evidence, the Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State 
Security Service (BStU) stated that there was no evidence that John had been brought over 
the border by force. There again, there is the tiny hint of a suggestion that Wohlgemuth had 
dealt directly with the Soviets. ‘Clearly the preparatory talks took place with Soviet security 
forces.’71  
 
Despite all the published and unpublished evidence – including the twenty four volumes of 
Stasi files – how John came to end up in East Berlin remains a mystery. An assessment of his 
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state of mind is crucial in assessing whether he was a victim of abduction or a traitor. A 
Liberal parliamentary representative, Reinhold Maier, suggested that he might have been 
‘partially abducted, partially led astray’.72 According to this view, the Soviets exploited his 
psychological weakness and disillusionment, but also applied drugs and duress. No 
conclusive proof, one way or the other, has surfaced. We are limited to partial, second-hand 
extracts of the contents of KGB files on John. Although the successor to the KGB refused to 
allow John access to his file, they did offer it for sale to West German journalists working on 
a documentary about the case. Although arguing that John had come to East Berlin of his 
own volition ‘for a prearranged meeting’, they nevertheless suggested that he was a ‘dissolute 
and vacillating man’.73 They wanted an agent while he wanted an open break with Adenauer. 
The KGB file suggested that John initiated and carried out the broadcast on his own and 
could have left the GDR whenever he wanted to.74  
 
These leaked extracts of the Soviet dossier stressed that John’s arrival in the Soviet Sector 
was voluntary and that John was driven by a desire to meet with diplomatic representatives of 
the USSR to discuss his political views. This was the version that the KGB presented after 
John published his memoirs in 1969.75 The KGB had hoped to recruit him, but John’s 
particular stance – condemning Adenauer but refusing to betray his organization’s agents – 
made his recruitment ‘inexpedient and unrealistic’.76 Kondrashev and Murphy conclude that 
the KGB viewed John as too emotional and volatile. Undercover agents require equanimity 
and John lacked this essential quality.77 Clutching at straws, John later concluded that the 
KGB must have abducted him in order to find out how much he (and by extension the 
British) knew about their mole Kim Philby. Nevertheless, while presenting the Soviet 
version, Kondrashev and Murphy conclude that we cannot say with certainty whether John 
went voluntarily to his ‘KGB tryst’ or whether he was given a helping hand by 
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Wohlgemuth.78 The latter’s comment to his Stasi handlers, ‘But I helped you’ is interesting if 
not conclusive.79 
 
John was adamant that he crossed the border unconscious and woke up in Karlshorst. A 
KGB officer suggested that John had been drugged shortly after he arrived in East Berlin in 
order to soften him up so that he went along with the defection story. Espionage chief 
Jewgenij Pitowranow stated that when John refused to cooperate by returning to his post as a 
double agent, they put him to sleep.80 This is quite close to John’s own version. John argued 
that he only woke up groggily on the 22nd or 23rd July. Coming out of his stupor, he 
immediately condemned the ‘gangster methods’ and practised passive resistance.81 
Nevertheless, he began to realize that his survival depended on his feigned cooperation: ‘I 
had to say something. I had to play along with them.’ He feared that they would use drugs or 
other means ‘to get everything I knew out of me.’82 Whatever the truth, John clung to the 
claim that he had been drugged and kidnapped. The precise details of how he came to be on 
the wrong side of the border remain murky, but this was the version that he maintained and 





CIA psychiatrist Alfred Paumier argued that ‘probing the wellsprings of John’s defection and 
redefection is necessary’ so that we can ‘learn to detect betrayal before it is unsheathed’.84 
Churchill’s epigram for Russia under Stalin – ‘a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an 
enigma’ – could well apply to John. In December 1971, he referred to the accusations of 
treachery by writing, ‘I dare to say that I have always remained true to myself.’85 In the 
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media frenzy that followed his disappearance, all his faults and foibles were exposed to the 
world. Nevertheless, he remained opaque and inscrutable. The BfV president was either the 
Soviets’ most high-profile abductee, cowed into cooperation, or a naïve and unstable German 
patriot, who wore his heart on his sleeve. Although partial and in large parts contradictory, 
the evidence points to the latter position. John was both an upright and purposeful patriot and 
a weak and unbalanced person. The ease with which he slipped into the role of critic of 
Gehlen and Adenauer suggest that these were his sincerely held beliefs.  
 
Trevor-Roper observed, ‘To cross the lines once in a time of ideological war is common 
enough, indeed part of the necessary lubrication of the secret service industry. To cross them 
twice looks like carelessness. To do so three times suggests a serious problem.’86 With 
retrospect, John is seen as a triple agent, caught between the fronts with muddled, tangled 
loyalties. Stöver suggests that John’s actions could be explained by recognizing that how he 
saw the world was strongly influenced by his experiences in the anti-Hitler opposition. 
Contacting the KGB was a repeat of his position as secret negotiator for the resistance 
plotters. Because going over to the enemy was the way he had acted in the past, he could not 
see another way to accomplish his mission.87 What for others would be an impossible leap in 
the dark was, for him, almost an automatic reaction. 
 
Harry Söderman stated: He [John] was a very sensitive person. The 
commemoration service for the victims of the 20 July plot, his brother being 
one of them, really got him down. His flight was madness, but I think John 
really believed that through his arrival in East Berlin he could promote the 
reunification of Germany. John’s thoughts were still caught up in his wartime 




In Neues Deutschland, John had been quoted as saying that ‘a demonstrative act was needed’ 
if all Germans were to commit themselves to denazification and reunification.89 He seems to 
have been bold or naïve enough to think that his defection could provide the necessary spark 
for sweeping political reform followed by national unity. CIA writer Delmege Trimble 
diagnosed him as having a ‘persecution and Messiah complex’.90 Fellow CIA writers  
Murphy and Bailey talks of John’s ‘emotional, quixotic nature’.91 
 
A psychiatric assessment judged him overly in need of admiration and with a tendency to 
overestimate his own abilities.92 John seems to have genuinely believed that he was guarantor 
of the values of the German resistance and thereby embodied the integrity of the nation. 
Witness Dr Hans Egidi, Security Director of the Ministry of the Interior, said that John was 
driven by romanticism to make dramatic gestures.93 John’s crossing seems less like ice-cold 
betrayal and more a hot-headed moment of passion. He does seem to have been highly 
idealistic and emotionally short-fused, with a tendency to tilt at windmills.94 Journalist Don 
Cook suggested that there was something about his reflective, introspective personality that 
wired his brain differently to other people. Because ‘he had lived dangerously and 
emotionally’, he was conditioned to feel deeply about political issues and to act decisively.95 
This gave him a taste for melodrama and histrionics.  
 
Distrusting the old military men and opposing the remilitarization that allowed them to re-
establish themselves, he was horrified by the prospect of another war and determined to make 
a stand against it. With hindsight, it seems that John had indelibly fused his pursuit of 
denazification with a sensational and decisive, sudden gesture. The electrifying act of tying 
his colours to the mast was both a demonstration of his integrity and an act of betrayal. His 
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repeated changing of sides suggested someone prone to adventurous, but impractical and 
unrealistic actions. He repeatedly felt that going over to the enemy could transform political 
circumstances and thereby end an intolerable situation. Mentally, he narrowed down his 
options until only an abrupt volte-face was possible. Rather than a turning point in the cold 
war, it became a personal tragedy. His letters repeatedly asked his wife to understand his 
‘sudden’ decision. He had personal demons that he sought to slay by demonstratively and 
repeatedly changing sides. In his determination to alter the political landscape in a radical and 
unalterable fashion, he became a stuck record or a faulty mechanism. However, the loss of 
touch with his friends and family (and other support bases) led only to a deeper sense of 
despair. 
 
John’s three apparent defections illustrated his difficulties in finding a political home for 
his idiosyncratic version of German patriotism. John betrayed his employers, the Adenauer 
government, out of the conviction that a more noble, united and anti-Nazi Germany was 
possible.96 Despite some initial consternation, his abrupt defection and dereliction of duty 
failed to galvanize opposition to the remilitarization of West Germany; it did not bring 
reunification any closer. The apparent betrayal by so important a counter-intelligence figure 
was a boon to the GDR, as they were still recovering from the June 1953 Uprising. Only J. 
Edgar Hoover going over to the Communist enemy would have created more cataclysmic a 
shock. As an insider, John was blowing the whistle on the apparent return of Nazis to the 
West German government (and its secret service). He revealed how deeply entwined 
Germany’s espionage networks were with the CIA. While a major setback for Adenauer, the 
disappearance of his rival immeasurably strengthened Reinhard Gehlen’s hand. Insulated 
from the nitty gritty of intelligence work in his own organization, let alone Gehlen’s, John 
could do little damage to West German espionage.  
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John’s preoccupation was reunification not undermining or destroying the Federal 
Republic. Exploiting French fears of German military resurgence would have been more 
effective, if he had stayed at his post and leaked. Nevertheless, the support of such an 
important symbolic figure – the defender and protector of the West German Constitution no 
less – helped to establish the GDR propaganda line of clear links between Adenauer’s 
government and a Nazi resurgence. John scuppered his own career by seeking to act as the 
conscience of the nation. Although his support for the 20 July resistance was noble and brave, 
henceforth his name was forever associated with treachery and self-destructive failure. The 
brief period of reckless abandon followed by endless regret and despair would fit with bipolar 
disorder. It was his misfortune to enter a brief phase of impulsivity or suggestibility at the 
height of cold-war bipolarity. 
 
This was one of the most enigmatic sagas of the cold war. It revealed a lot about the 
ambivalence of West German democratic renewal while pointing to the clear hazards of 
trying to work with the Soviets. The political damage John caused was greater than his 
impact on espionage activities. Nevertheless, the chief harm was done to the whistleblower 
himself. Mired in doubt and despair, the boomerang martyred himself with self-inflicted 
wounds. However he ended up in Karlshorst, John’s public statements about resurgent 
Nazism reflected his sincerely held beliefs. His brief stay in the limelight demonstrated both 
the problems of West German restoration under Adenauer – with former militarists and Nazis 
taking over important roles – and the problems of East German Communism – rigid, 
controlling and with similarities to the Nazi police state. John was both courageous and 
reckless, clever but ingenuous, a fierce anti-Nazi reduced to making Nazi gestures. However 
uncomfortable he was in West Germany, he found life in the GDR no easier. His dramatic 
border crossings, his defection and escape highlighted Berlin’s role as world capital of 
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espionage and kidnapping. The exact details of what happened still seem illusive. Only John 
and Wohlgemuth knew what really happened. The article points to the intersection of 
espionage and mental health. Its contribution is to provide a psychogramm of a presumed 
traitor. 
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